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ABSTRACT 
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) is one of the most controversial pieces of environmental 
legislation. Part of the controversy stems from doubts about its effectiveness in generating 
improvements in species viability. This paper uses ordered probit models to test whether the ESA 
has been successful in promoting species recovery. We find a negative correlation between listing 
and species recovery.  Additionally, we find evidence of positive effects for species-specific 
spending and the achievement of recovery goals. The evidence also shows that recovery plan 
completion and the designation of critical habit are not correlated or negatively correlated with 
recovery.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
  The Endangered Species Act (ESA, “the Act”) is one of the strongest pieces of 
environmental legislation in the U.S., and potentially one of the most costly. Smith et al. (1993) 
and Bean (1991) report a $4.6 billion estimate of the cost of implementing the ESA for all listed 
species. If private expenditures and the costs of foregone economic projects were added, the cost 
would undoubtedly be much higher. 
  The ESA is also extremely controversial.
1 The controversy centers on four issues.  First, 
some natural scientists argue that the ESA’s focus on species, rather than ecosystems, may limit its 
effectiveness (Rohlf 1991, Smith et al. 1993, Noss 1991). Second, the ESA may target species 
after it is too late to implement recovery (Smith, et al. 1993, Rohlf 1991). Third, others have 
argued the ESA is flawed in its implementation (Smith et al. 1993, Simon et al. 1995). Fourth, the 
ESA is criticized for placing an inordinate share of the cost of species protection on private 
landowners and developers. Taken to its extreme, this argument suggests that the ESA is 
counterproductive to the progress of a species toward recovery, as it may generate perverse 
incentives for landowners to manage their land in a way that harms imperiled species (Mann and 
Plummer 1995, Polasky and Doremus 1998, Innes 2000, Polasky 2001, Lueck and Michael 2000). 
Taken together, a substantive share of the ESA’s critics express doubts about its 
effectiveness in preventing extinctions or generating improvements in species viability. In short, its 
critics argue that an ESA which is biologically misdirected, administered poorly or in a politically 
motivated fashion, or causes landowners to take actions deleterious to species recovery is not likely 
to be effective in achieving its stated goal of providing a framework for the conservation and 
recovery of endangered and threatened species (Mann and Plummer 1995). 
Some of these arguments are voiced in several papers taking a political economy approach 
                                                        
1 Since 1992, the ESA has been funded only on an annual basis due to the lack of agreement on whether 
to weaken or strengthen it or to modify some of its provisions.     3 
to various aspects of the implementation of the ESA, including U.S. Fish and Wildlife (FWS) 
listing and funding decisions (Metrick and Weitzman 1996, 1998, Ando 1999, 2001, Cash 2001, 
Dawson and Shogren 2001). These papers provide evidence of the influence of non-scientific 
factors (e.g. species’ charisma, special interest group pressure, political considerations) on these 
decisions, but stop short of analyzing the ESA’s effectiveness. 
This paper takes the next step and asks how the political economy of the ESA affects its 
performance. We examine empirically whether ESA implementation, subject to various non-
scientific pressures, has been successful in achieving its objective of species recovery. We use data 
on changes in the status of vertebrates in the US to construct a measure of recovery, and then 
attempt to statistically explain this measure. Specifically, we analyze whether, and how, the 
recovery of threatened species is correlated to the various components of the management process 
stipulated by the ESA.  
The few existing studies of the ESA that ask similar questions are based on simple 
correlation analysis (Rachinski 1997, Foin et al. 1998, Beissinger and Perrine 2001, Abbitt and 
Scott 2001), and thus fail to simultaneously account for the many likely determinants of species 
recovery.  In this paper, we estimate the effect of ESA listing and management actions on species 
recovery, while controlling for the effect of species’ baseline status and biological characteristics.   
In section II of the paper, we establish a framework by discussing the political economy of 
the ESA and its potential implications for species recovery. Section III develops the score we use to 
measure species recovery status.  Sections IV and V present, respectively, estimates of the effects 
of ESA listing and ESA management actions on species recovery.  A summary of results and 
suggestions for future research end the paper.   
 II. FRAMEWORK: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ESA 
  The stated goal of the ESA is to protect species facing imminent danger of extinction and 
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to promote their recovery to the point where the protection conferred by the Act is no longer 
necessary. To achieve this goal, the ESA prescribes that the FWS implement a management 
process for endangered species. The process starts with the listing decision, followed by fund 
allocations, designations of critical habitat, achievement of recovery objectives, and completion of 
a recovery plan. 
  In principle, this process eventually leads to recovery of listed species. However, the 
implementation does not take place in a vacuum. The political economy theory introduced by 
Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976) suggests that FWS decisions may be made by economic agents 
in pursuit of their own objectives. For instance, preferences over characteristics of the species may 
drive their choices. Furthermore, interest groups, responding to the costs and benefits associated 
with this management process, may attempt to influence FWS decisions by appealing to these 
objectives. Interest groups can attempt to influence FWS decisions through comments, requests for 
hearings, petitions, or indirectly through Congress (Ando, 1999).  
  Extant empirical analyses of FWS decisions provide evidence that this is an accurate 
description of ESA implementation. Ando (1999, 2001) finds that the timing of FWS listing 
decisions responds to pressure from interest groups. Public opposition slows down the listing 
process, whereas public support speeds it up. Delays in the listing process may reduce the 
likelihood of a species’ recovery, but also postpone the costs. Delays may allow potentially 
affected parties to take irreversible actions to preempt restrictions following a listing. Furthermore, 
the probability that a species receives ESA protection appears to be affected by public pressure. 
Metrick and Weitzman (1996, 1998) show that both scientific and visceral elements enter into the 
listing decision. Purely scientific factors, such as uniqueness and degree of endangerment, have a 
significant effect on the listing decision, but so do existence value factors like size or the degree to   5 
which a species is considered a higher form of life
2. 
  Similar results are found for funding decisions. Metrick and Weitzman (1996, 1998) find 
that FWS spending choices are determined much more by visceral than by scientific 
characteristics. Cash (1991) finds that funding decisions are driven by political variables. Finally, 
Dawson and Shogren (2001) suggest that spending is insensitive to yearly variations in time-
variant factors (e.g. endangerment levels, economic conflict), but that time-invariant factors (e.g. 
historical use, cultural value, size, charisma) do matter. This may indicate either that FWS is 
taking a long-term perspective based on species/ecosystems considerations, or responding to 
political pressures supporting certain species.  
Thus, it has been clearly established that ESA listing and management implementation is 
subject to numerous pressures affecting FWS decisions. What does this imply for the status of 
imperiled species?  At first glance, it is hard to argue that listing alone has a significant effect on 
species’ recovery. By 1999, with 1,746 species listed (FWS 1999), only twenty-seven had been 
delisted: seven because they went extinct, eleven because additional information revealed listing 
was unwarranted, and eight because they actually recovered (Abbitt and Scott 2001). Should the 
fact that only seven listed species have gone extinct be considered a success? Alternatively, should 
we regard only eight delistings due to recovery as a failure? 
The effects of the funding decisions are equally ambiguous, as higher spending does not 
necessarily seem to buy more recovery (Baker 1999, Bean 1999). This can be seen in Table I, 
which shows the ten species receiving the most federal and state spending between 1989 and 1996, 
and the changes in their population status between 1990 and 1996
3 (FWS 1990a, 1996a). 
                                                        
2 However, Cash (1991) repeats the analysis performed by Metrick and Weitzman including only species 
listed since 1982 (when Congress mandated that taxonomic class could no longer be a criterion for 
listing), and finds that non-scientific variables lose their explanatory power. 
3  This does not include four listed runs of salmon managed by the National Marine and Fisheries Service, 
who does not provide the same information as the FWS on population status.  
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    TABLE I: TOTAL SPENDING AND CHANGE IN STATUS 
Species Total  Spending 
(Millions $)  
% Total  Change in status 
Red Cockaded Woodpecker  128.0 7.79  Declining-Improving 
Northern Spotted Owl  108.3  6.59  Declining-Declining 
Bald Eagle  72.4  4.40  Improving-Improving 
West Indian Manatee  38.3  2.33  Declining-Declining 
Grizzly Bear  37.8  2.30  Stable-Stable 
Mojave Desert Tortoise  37.5  2.28  Declining-Uncertain 
Colorado Squawfish  37.2  2.26  Stable-Stable 
American Peregrine Falcon  35.9  2.19  Improving-Improving 
Marbled Murrelet  33.4  2.03  Declining-Declining 
Loggerhead Sea Turtle  29.4  1.79  Declining-Uncertain 
 
These ten species represent 1.04 percent of all listed species in 1996, but received a third 
of total spending, about $558 million. Of these, only the red cockaded woodpecker (Picoides 
borealis) was doing noticeably better, while the status of most others had not changed.  
This pattern suggests that the political economy context in which the ESA is implemented, 
by influencing FWS decisions, may hinder the Act’s effectiveness in generating species recovery. 
In the following sections, we examine whether this is likely to be the case. To do so, we start by 
defining a usable measure of species recovery.  
III. MEASURING ENDANGERED SPECIES RECOVERY 
  To assess the extent of a species’ recovery, we need to know how its status changes over 
time and relate these changes to the ESA’s management process. Ideally, we would base our 
analysis on changes in relevant biological indicators, such as population size, genetic diversity, 
reproductive rates, etc. However, such information is unavailable for most species. Instead, we 
must rely on assessments of conservation status prepared by various organizations, including the 
FWS, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), and 
the Nature Conservancy/Natural Heritage Network (NC).  
  The FWS classifies each listed species as ‘improving’, ‘stable’, ‘declining’, ‘found only in 
captivity’, ‘extinct’, or ‘unknown’. The latter category reflects insufficient information to assign   7 
the species to any other category. Species are assigned to categories based on changes in 
population and the degree of threat in the wild. FWS periodically revises its classification (the 
latest available is FWS 1996a).  
The IUCN’s “Red List” focuses on threatened species and classifies them as ‘endangered’, 
‘vulnerable’, ‘rare’, or ‘extinct’. In addition, IUCN has broader categories for different degrees of 
uncertainty. Species classified as ‘indeterminate’ can be endangered, vulnerable or rare, whereas 
‘insufficiently known’ means that there is not enough information to place the species in any 
category.  The ‘threatened’ category includes endangered, vulnerable, rare, indeterminate, or 
insufficiently known species. IUCN assigns categories based on changes in species distribution, 
numbers, and degree and type of threat.  
NC assessments are the most complete. NC ranks all, not just threatened or listed, 
vertebrate species, using a numerical ranking. The categories are ‘critically imperiled’ (1), 
‘imperiled’ (2), ‘vulnerable’ (3), ‘apparently secure’ (4), and ‘secure’ (5). Non-numerical 
categories are ‘presumed extinct’ and ‘possibly extinct’. NC rankings reflect the risk of extinction, 
and are based on an evaluation of threats, total population size and trends, number of different 
populations or occurrences, extent of habitat, and breadth of geographic range for each species.  
We choose the NC ranking system to construct a recovery score because of its five 
advantages relative to FWS and IUCN.  First, it does not have any “uncertain” categories, such as 
the ‘unknown’ (FWS) or ‘indeterminate’ (IUCN) rankings. Second, each NC category has a well-
defined meaning, and NC tries to apply the rankings consistently. Third, it is broader than the 
FWS’s ranking, since there are species considered endangered, but not listed, under the ESA, in 
part because of long delays in the listing process (Ando 1999). Fourth, Metrick and Weitzman 
(1996) use the NC ranking because they consider it “the most comprehensive and objective” 
measure of endangerment available. Finally, by using the NC ranking we maintain consistency with 
nearly all extant empirical studies of the ESA (Metrick and Weitzman 1996, 1998, Cash 2001,   8 
Dawson and Shogren 2001).  
A potential disadvantage of using the NC ranking is data availability. To our knowledge, 
no record of the NC’s rankings has been maintained over time. Therefore, we have rankings only 
for 1993 and 1996, limiting this study to changes in species’ status in this short period.  Further, 
the data almost exclusively contains species ranked between 1 and 3 in 1993. This hints at a 
potential sample selection problem, which we address below.  
The simplest approach to using NC rankings to assess recovery is to determine whether a 
species’ rank has increased, remained the same, or decreased from 1993 to 1996. However, this 
approach has serious drawbacks.  Primarily, NC rankings show little temporal species-specific 
variation. Eighty six percent of species exhibit no change in ranking, eight percent a decline, and 
only six percent show an improvement.  Thus, the simple approach may not provide enough 
information for econometric analysis.     
 The simple approach also masks important information by assuming it is equivalent if a 
species remains stable at a low (i.e. more endangered) ranking and if it remains stable at a higher 
(i.e. less endangered) ranking. However, endangered species with smaller populations are more 
vulnerable to stochastic events, such as changes in reproductive success, genetic makeup, weather, 
and food availability (Gilpin and Soulé 1986). In addition, species persisting in small populations 
are less able to fill their functions in an ecosystem. Thus, it is qualitatively different for a species to 
remain stable at a higher ranking than at a lower one.  
Similarly, the simple approach assumes that it is equivalent if the ranking of a species 
changes from, say, ‘critically imperiled’ (1) to ‘imperiled’ (2) and if it changes from ‘vulnerable’ 
(3) to ‘apparently secure’ (4). However, achieving further recovery can be more difficult at higher 
rankings, because there is more room for improvement when species are closer to extinction than 
when they are fairly secure. Relatively simple management actions can have a significant effect on 
highly endangered species, whereas achieving progress for more stable species often requires   9 
addressing more complex issues and undertaking more complicated management actions. Consider, 
for example, that mortality rates for the endangered Florida manatee (Trichechus manatus) have 
increased significantly since the mid-1970s (Wallace 1994). Relatively simple actions, like 
establishment of protected areas and waterway slow-speed zones, can address the main human-
related cause of mortality (collisions with boats) and likely achieve some initial recovery. However, 
further recovery must address habitat degradation and pollution, and these threats are related to 
complex underlying causes, like Florida’s rapidly growing coastal population. Thus, improvement 
at higher rankings is qualitatively different from improvement at lower rankings.      
We extract more information from NC ranking changes by constructing a detailed measure 
that differentiates between changes at different levels of endangerment. Specifically, we consider an 
improvement better than no change and no change better than a change for worse. Additionally, 
improvements are better at higher than at lower rankings, declines are worse at lower than at higher 
rankings, and no change at a higher ranking is better than no change at a lower ranking.  
    The resulting recovery score, which we call RSCORE, appears in the matrix below, 
showing all possible changes in NC rank. The changes actually contained in our data are shown in 
the shaded cells, along with the corresponding score we assign. The numbers in parentheses are the 
percentages of species in our data found in each category.   10 
RSCORE 
  NC 
Rank To         









(0.2%)   
2 











 2   
(3.0%) 









 1   
(0.2%) 
 5   
(0.2%)    
    5             
 
To illustrate RSCORE, consider a few specific examples.  The Sonora Chub (Gila 
ditaenia) declined from rank 3 to rank 1 and receives RSCORE = 2; the California Condor 
(Gymnogyps californicus) remained stable at rank 1, with RSCORE = 6; the American Peregrine 
Falcon (Falco peregrinus) remained stable at rank 3 and has RSCORE = 8; and the American 
Black Bear (Ursus americanus) improved from rank 3 to rank 5, and receives RSCORE = 13. 
The distribution of listed species across categories reflects the arguments of both the 
ESA’s critics and supporters. The majority of species (85.4 percent) showed no change in status, 
receiving RSCORE = 6, 7, or 8. Critics point to this widespread stasis as evidence of ESA failure; 
others consider it evidence of success (Mann and Plummer 1995, Bean 1991). Improvements in 
status (RSCORE = 9 to RSCORE = 16) are achieved by 5.7 percent of species, bolstering the 
arguments of ESA supporters. However, its critics could point to the deterioration in status 
(RSCORE = 1 to RSCORE = 5) by 9 percent of species. RSCORE thus provides a mixed picture 
of ESA performance. It also provides a means of empirically linking changes in species viability 
with specific actions taken under the ESA. In the following sections, we use RSCORE to examine 
the ESA’s effectiveness in generating species recovery. 
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IV. THE EFFECT OF LISTING ON RECOVERY 
We begin by considering how RSCORE is related only to the listing decision. Individuals 
or organizations can propose a species as a candidate for listing. If the FWS is able to collect 
enough data and judges that the species merits protection, it places a proposal in the Federal 
Register and, after public comment, makes a final decision. The species is listed as “endangered” if 
it is “in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range” or “threatened” if 
it is “likely to become endangered in the foreseeable future” (FWS 1993b). Different taxonomic 
units, species, subspecies, and populations, are eligible for listing. 
Once listed, a species comes under several layers of protection, followed by a   
prescription of management actions.  This prescription is variously applied depending on the 
species. In this section, we estimate the effect of listing, and leave a discussion of the effect of 
various management actions to the following section.   
Properly estimating the effect of listing on species recovery cannot be done in isolation.  
We must also control for the biological characteristics of the species and its baseline status.  
Species recovery (or degradation) is somewhat random, particularly in the case of small 
populations
4 (e.g. Gilpin and Soulé 1986). However, the likelihood of extinction probably depends 
on population size (Shaffer 1981, Goodman 1987, Pimm et al. 1988), longevity (Pimm et al. 
1988), population growth rate, and the variability of growth rate and density (Goodman 1987, 
Pimm et al. 1988). Data on most of these variables is not obtainable for all the vertebrates in the 
U.S. However, longevity and growth rate are highly correlated with body size, which is readily 
available (Cash et al. 1998).  The precise relationship between these variables remains 
                                                        
4  Specifically, population size may be subject to four sources of stochasticity: (1) demographic 
stochasticity, which refers to survival and reproductive success; (2) genetic stochasticity, which refers to 
random changes in genetic make-up; (3) environmental stochasticity, which refers to unpredictable 
changes in environmental factors such as weather, food supply, etc.; and (4) natural catastrophes, such as 
floods, droughts, etc.  
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controversial (Pimm et al. 1988, Tracy and George 1992, Bennet and Owens 1997).  Due to data 
availability, we rely on Johst and Brandl’s (1997) apparently unifying result, a U-shaped 
relationship between body size and extinction.  We include body length (BODYLENGTH) and its 
square (BODYLENGHT
2) as explanatory variables.   We also include indicator variables to 
control for taxonomic differences (MAMMAL, AMPHIBIAN, BIRD, REPTILE) and an indicator 
variable for monotypic species (MONOTYPIC). Finally, we use the IUCN categories from 1990 to 
control for population size, and other baseline ecological determinants of species recovery.  The 
antecedent IUCN ranking is, a priori, exogenous to changes in species recovery from 1993 to 
1996.   
To estimate the effect of ESA listing on species recovery, we regress RSCORE on a vector 
of recovery determinants, including the indicator variable LISTED = 1 if the species is listed as 
endangered or threatened under the ESA.  Since RSCORE is discrete and logically ordered, we use 
the ordered probit maximum likelihood method for estimation (see Appendix).  We also pursue a 
strategy of estimating several versions of the model and testing for endogeneity and sample 
selection bias to determine whether the estimated effects of listing are robust.  Table II provides 
definitions and descriptive statistics for all the variables we use.   13 
TABLE II: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variable                      Description  Mean  St.Dev. 
  LISTED  Dummy: Species listed    0.42  0.3E-03 
  TIMEL  Time species has been listed (years)  18.03  9.29 
  CONFLICT  Dummy: Conflict with development    0.39  0.9E-03 
  PRIORITY  FWS conservation priority ranking: 1-18    5.79  3.54   
Management:      
  SPENDING  Total spending on species, 1989-1996   4108  12567 
  HABITAT  Dummy: Critical habitat designated    0.28  0.7E-03 
  PLAN  Degree of recovery plan completion (1-6)    4.47  1.88 
  SOMEPLAN  Dummy: Recovery plan initiated, not complete    0.45  0.9E-03 
  FINALPLAN  Dummy: Final recovery plan completed    0.52  0.9E-03 
  OBJECTIVES  Percentage of recov. objectives achieved (1-4)    1.46  0.80 
  OBJECTIVES2  Dummy: 26-50% of recov. object. achieved    0.17  0.5E-03 
  OBJECTIVES3  Dummy: 51-75% of recov. object. achieved    0.10  0.3E-03 
  OBJECTIVES4  Dummy: 76-100% of recov. object. achieved    0.03  0.1E-03 
Baseline Status:       
  ENDANGERED  Dummy: Red List endangered status    0.12  0.1E-03 
  VULNERABLE  Dummy: Red List vulnerable status    0.13  0.2E-03 
  RARE  Dummy: Red List rare status    0.11  0.1E-03 
  INDETERMINATE  Dummy: Red List indeterminate status    0.02  0.2E-04 
  UNKNOWN  Dummy: Red List unknown status    0.02  0.2E-04 
  REDLIST1  Numerical values for Red List categories: 0-4    3.24  1.10  
Biological:      
  BODYLENGTH  Species’ body length (cm.)    64.9  284.68 
  MAMMAL  Dummy: species is a mammal    0.16  0.2E-03 
  AMPHIBIAN  Dummy: species is an amphibian    0.11  0.1E-03 
  BIRD  Dummy: species is a bird    0.22  0.2E-03 
  REPTILE  Dummy: species is a reptile    0.09  0.1E-03 
  MONOTYPIC  Dummy: species is the only one in its genus    0.07  0.8E-04 
 
Table III presents the initial RSCORE ordered probit results, with four variants of the 
basic model.  Turning first to the baseline and biological variables, Models 1-4 suggest, as 
expected, that species with a lower IUCN ranking (poorer baseline status) in 1989 are less likely to 
achieve more recovery, or a higher RSCORE.  For example, in Models 1-3, the coefficient for 
IUCN’s ENDANGERED species is negative and statistically significant, while 
INDETERMINATE species have a positive, although insignificant coefficient.  For biological 
determinants (Models 2-4), the results consistently suggest that REPTILE species are less likely to 
achieve higher levels of recovery, while other taxa coefficients are never statistically significant.   14 
Consistent with Jost and Brandl’s (1997) results, the estimates for BODYLENGTH and its square 
suggest a significant positive but diminishing relationship between species size and recovery. In 
addition, MONOTYPIC species appear to be less likely to achieve higher recovery scores.  
TABLE III: EFFECT OF LISTING ON RECOVERY 
  MODEL 1  MODEL 2  MODEL 3  MODEL 4 
Constant 3.32 3.30  3.31  2.79 
LISTED -0.63***  -0.59***  -0.58***  -0.60*** 
BODYLENGTH   0.61E-02***  0.71E-02***  0.66E-02***  0.70E-02*** 
BODYLENGTH
2  -0.16E-04** -0.18E-04**  -0.17E-04**  -0.18E-04** 
REDLIST1 -----  ----- -----  0.14*** 
ENDANGERED -0.42***  -0.53***  -0.54***  ----- 
VULNERABLE -0.02  -0.09  -0.09  ----- 
RARE -0.15  -0.18  -0.21  ----- 
INDETERMINATE 0.50  0.49  0.49  ----- 
UNKNOWN 0.11  0.27  0.27  ----- 
MAMMAL -----  0.09 0.11 0.06 
AMPHIBIAN -----  -0.11  -0.13  -0.10 
BIRD -----  -0.18  -0.17  -0.23 
REPTILE -----  -0.42**  -0.41**  -0.42** 
MONOTYPIC -----  -----  -0.28E-02*** -0.27E-02*** 
Log Likelihood  -836.9 -832.7  -828.4  -792.2 
Mc Fadden’s R
2  0.04 0.05  0.05  0.05 
￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ LQGLFDWH SDUDPHWHU VLJQLILFDQFH DW .  ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ DQG 0.01, respectively. 
Most notable is the estimated influence of LISTED.  Over Models 1-4, LISTED’s 
parameter estimate is significantly negative, suggesting a negative correlation between listing and 
species viability (additional models were estimated with different ways of including a species’ Red 
List status in 1990, and the results remain robust). The calculated marginal effects (not shown) re-
enforce this conclusion.  The estimates show that a listed species has a lower probability of having 
an RSCORE>8, and a higher probability of decline, with RSCORE ￿￿￿    15 
To explore the robustness of the result that listing is negatively related to species viability 
improvement, we perform three additional experiments.  First, although most species were listed 
before 1993, we test for the endogeneity of the listing decision, since a species with a lower 
RSCORE may be more likely to have been listed, and vice versa.  Conducting a Hausman test 
(Greene 2000), we estimate a reduced-form probit model for the listing decision and obtain a 
predicted probability that each species is listed.  We entered the difference between LISTED and 
the prediction as a regressor into Models 1-4. The t-statistics on the coefficients for this regressor 
ranged from –0.18 to –0.39, so we fail to reject the null hypothesis that LISTED is exogenous.  
  In a second experiment, we explore the possibility that the length of time a species is listed 
influences recovery.  This effect cannot be captured when LISTED enters as an indicator variable.  
In Models 5-8, we interacted LISTED with the number of years a species has been listed, so that 
LISTEDxTIMEL is zero for non-listed species and the length of listing for listed species. The 
results, presented in Table IV, are nearly identical, with no substantive changes to the coefficients 
of any baseline or biological variables.  The LISTEDxTIMEL coefficient is invariably negative 
and statistically significant, again suggesting a negative correlation between being listed and the 
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TABLE IV: EFFECT OF TIME LISTED ON RECOVERY 
      MODEL 5  MODEL 6  MODEL 7  MODEL 8   
Constant     3.16     3.22     3.24     2.55 
 
LISTEDxTIMEL  -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 
BODYLENGTH   0.69E-02***   0.82E-02***   0.76E-02***   0.79E-02*** 
 
BODYLENGTH
2  -0.17E-04** -0.19E-04** -0.18E-04** -0.18E-04** 
 
REDLIST1     -----     -----   -----     0.18*** 
 
ENDANGERED -0.56*** -0.67*** -0.69***   ----- 
 
VULNERABLE  -0.09   -0.13   -0.14     ----- 
 
RARE    -0.21   -0.22   -0.26*     ----- 
 
INDETERMINATE   0.36     0.37     0.36     ----- 
 
UNKNOWN     -0.07     0.15     0.12     ----- 
 
MAMMAL     -----     0.13     0.16     0.11 
 
AMPHIBIAN     -----   -0.09   -0.08   -0.05 
 
BIRD      -----   -0.18   -0.13   -0.18 
 
REPTILE     -----   -0.51*** -0.50*** -0.53*** 
 
MONOTYPIC     -----     -----   -0.28E-02*** -0.28E-02*** 
 
Log Likelihood    -820.6   -823.8   -810.5   -779.7 
 
Mc Fadden’s R
2    0.04      0.04      0.05      0.05 
￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ LQGLFDWH SDUDPHWHU VLJQLILFDQFH DW .  ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ DQG ￿￿￿￿￿ UHVSHFWLYHO\￿ 
     
  Third, we allow for the possibility that listing has a different effect on different taxa.  This 
is consistent with the political economy literature showing that FWS favors different taxa (e.g. 
Metrick and Weitzman 1996,1998). We reestimated our models interacting the taxonomic dummies 
with the listing variables (e.g. MAMMALxLISTED). The results are presented in Table V.   17 
TABLE V: EFFECT OF LISTING ON RECOVERY OF DIFFERENT TAXA 
    MODEL  9  MODEL  10  MODEL  11   
Constant       3.25     3.25     2.87 
 
BODYLENGTH     0.54E-02**   0.51E-02**   0.54E-02** 
 
BODYLENGTH
2   -0.15E-04**  -0.14E-04*  -0.15E-04* 
 
REDLIST1       -----     -----     0.10** 
 
ENDANGERED  -0.44*** -0.44***   ----- 
 
VULNERABLE    -0.92E-02 -0.63E-02   ----- 
 
RARE     -0.15   -0.17     ----- 
 
INDETERMINATE      0.43     0.44     ----- 
 
UNKNOWN      0.12     0.12     ----- 
 
MAMMALxLISTED   -0.47**   -0.45**   -0.55*** 
 
AMPHIBIANxLISTED   -0.79**   -0.78**   -0.93** 
 
BIRDxLISTED    -0.59*** -0.57*** -0.64*** 
 
REPTILExLISTED     -0.64***  -0.62***  -0.61** 
 
FISHxLISTED    -0.69*** -0.68*** -0.68*** 
 
MONOTYPIC        -----    -0.28E-02*** -0.28E-02*** 
Log  Likelihood    -836.2   -831.9   -800.7 
Mc Fadden’s R
2        0.04      0.05      0.05 
￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ LQGLFDWH SDUDPHWHU VLJQLILFDQFH DW .  ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ DQG ￿￿￿￿￿ UHVSHFWLYHO\￿ 
Remarkably, the parameter estimates for the interacted taxa and LISTED variables are all 
negaWLYH DQG VWDWLVWLFDOO\ VLJQLILFDQW ￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿ DQG WKHUH DUH QR VXEVWDQWLYH FKDQJHV WR WKH RWKHU
parameter estimates.  These results suggest the negative correlation between listing and recovery 
holds across different taxa, and there is no apparent pattern of differential effects for higher order 
taxa.  This latter result may be surprising given the previous findings that the FWS seems to favor 
mammals, birds, and fish (Metrick and Weitzman 1996, 1998, Simon et al. 1995).    18 
In a final experiment, we test for sample selection bias, since the dependent variable 
contains almost only species considered somewhat endangered by the NC, i.e. only species that 
have NC ranks of 1,2, or 3.  We use Heckman’s two-step procedure.  In the first step, the selection 
equation is estimated. The dependent variable is RANK3 = 1 if NC rank ￿ ￿ LQ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ RWKHUZLVH￿
The estimated coefficients are used to calculate the inverse Mills ratio, λ ˆ . In the second step, we 
include λ ˆ  as an additional regressor in the RSCORE ordered probit regression.  The results 
appear in Table VI. The parameter estimates for λ ˆ are not statistically significant in Models 12-
15, so we fail to reject the null of no sample selection bias.  Even with these models, potentially 
corrected for sample selection bias, we find a negative correlation between listing and recovery.  
With the exception of MONOTYPIC, all of the other coefficients retain their signs and statistical 
significance.     19 
TABLE VI: SAMPLE SELECTION BIAS TEST 
      MODEL 12  MODEL 13  MODEL 14  MODEL 15   
Constant     3.22     3.50     3.50     2.79 
 
LISTED  -0.61*** -0.67*** -0.66*** -0.65*** 
 
BODYLENGTH   0.58E-02**   0.73E-02***   0.74E-02***   0.75E-02*** 
 
BODYLENGTH
2  -0.16E-04** -0.18E-04** -0.18E-04** -0.18E-04** 
 
REDLIST1     -----     -----   -----     0.16*** 
 
ENDANGERED -0.42**   -0.64*** -0.63***   ----- 
 
VULNERABLE  -0.97E-02  -0.20   -0.19     ----- 
 
RARE    -0.16   -0.34*   -0.34*     ----- 
 
INDETERMINATE   0.51     0.48     0.48     ----- 
 
UNKNOWN     0.12     0.19     0.18     ----- 
 
MAMMAL     -----     0.11     0.11     0.07 
 
AMPHIBIAN     -----   -0.19   -0.19   -0.13 
 
BIRD      -----   -0.11   -0.11   -0.19 
 
REPTILE     -----   -0.49**   -0.49**   -0.47** 
 
MONOTYPIC     -----     -----   -0.06   -0.07 
 
  λ ˆ    0.03   -0.35   -0.35   -0.22 
    t –  statistic   (0.10)   (-0.93)   (-0.91)   (-0.75) 
 
Log Likelihood    -827.3   -822.7   -822.6   -791.9 
 
Mc Fadden’s R
2  0.04     0.05     0.05     0.04 
*, **, *** indicate parameter significance at .  ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ DQG ￿￿￿￿￿ UHVSHFWLYHO\￿ 
  
V. SPECIES RECOVERY AND ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES 
Commencing with ESA listing, a species may be the subject of several administrative 
actions, including designation of critical habitat, development of a recovery plan, species-specific   20 
spending, and other less-easily-measured methods of accomplishing recovery objectives.  In this 
section, we estimate the effect of these management actions on species recovery. 
A. Management of endangered species under the ESA 
  Designation of critical habitat links recovery to the importance of habitat and ecosystem 
protection. Section 4 of the ESA originally required that critical habitat be designated for each 
species listed. However, amendments enacted in 1982 require critical habitat designation only to 
the “maximum extent prudent and determinable”. Furthermore, the amendments allow 
consideration of economic impact in the designation of critical habitat. Rohlf (1991), Clark (1994), 
Smith et al. (1993), and others criticize the FWS for failure to designate sufficient acreage or, for 
the majority of species, any acreage at all. Supporters of the amendment contend that designation 
of critical habitat has a negative effect on the economy. Moreover, Belovsky et al. (1994) contend 
that habitat loss is generally not decisive in species extinction when populations are already small. 
In 1996, 27% of listed vertebrates had critical habitat designated (FWS 1996a). We measure this 
management action with an indicator variable, HABITAT.   
  The second action triggered by listing is the preparation of a recovery plan. Section 4 
requires the FWS to develop recovery plans for listed species, unless such plans would “not 
promote the conservation of the species.” Recovery plans identify management tasks and research 
needs, and identify measurable criteria to determine when recovery objectives have been attained. 
Some species do not have recovery plans, either because a state management plan is used instead 
or because the FWS considers the species probably extinct. In 1996, 79% of listed vertebrates had 
a recovery plan (FWS 1996a).  To measure this management action, we use the variable PLAN, a 
1-6 discrete variable increasing as the recovery plans moves closer to completion. 
The FWS has been widely criticized for recovery plan procedures and results.  Tear et al. 
(1995) argue that most plans fail to provide biological data essential for recovery decisions, 
including species abundance, demographics and dynamics. Moreover, recovery plans are subject to   21 
lengthy delays (Smith et al. 1993). Plans frequently require five or more years for approval (Tear 
et al. 1995).  The plan for the Northern Rocky Mountain wolf was 14 years in preparation. 
Furthermore, recovery plans are not binding agreements and critics argue that they are not 
implemented in many cases (Smith et al. 1993). Others argue that recovery plans sacrifice good 
biology for economic considerations or, alternatively, fail to address the political realities of species 
recovery (see Smith et al. 1993).   
A third action is the allocation of federal and state dollars to promote recovery, such as 
habitat acquisition, censuses, mitigation, and scientific research. Species-specific spending was 
$348 million in 1995, an increase of over 800 percent since 1985 (Baker 1999). Some argue that 
current spending levels are inadequate to achieve the ESA’s stated goals, but that additional 
spending would lead to improvements (Smith et al. 1993, Mann and Plummer 1995, and Bean 
1991).  Critics argue that funds are poorly spent and the goals are impossible to achieve. Simon et 
al. (1995) find that species-specific spending is unrelated to FWS recovery rankings, but may 
reveal taxonomic biases. However, we are not aware of any studies directly testing the 
effectiveness of spending. Species-specific funding (SPENDING) is total federal and state 
expenditures directed toward the recovery of a species for the years 1989-1996 (FWS 1989, 
1990b, 1991, 1992b, 1993, 1994b, 1995, 1996b). SPENDING includes all expenditures that are 
“reasonably identifiable” for a specific species, such as habitat acquisition, scientific research, 
population censuses, etc. Expenditures not assigned to a specific species and spending from private 
sources are not included.    
An output-oriented measure of management action reported by FWS is the 
accomplishment of recovery objectives.  It is important to distinguish between species recovery 
plans and recovery objectives. One can think of the elaboration of a recovery plan as more of a 
formal requirement, whereas recovery objectives are specific goals set for “on the ground”   22 
management of a species
5. Furthermore, preparing a recovery plan is not a necessary condition for 
achieving recovery objectives. In 1996, the recovery plan for the least bell’s vireo (Vireo bellii 
pusillus) was under development, but between half and three quarters of its recovery objectives had 
been achieved (FWS 1996a). The accomplishment of recovery objectives is measured discretely as 
OBJECTIVES = 1 if 0-25 percent of objectives were achieved as of 1996, 2 if 26-50 percent, 3 if 
51-75 percent, and 4 if 76-100 percent.  
  We also control for three other factors. As in previous models, we interact the length of 
time the species has been listed with LISTED.  Similarly, we include interaction variables for:  
CONFLICT=1 if the FWS determines that the recovery of the species with conflict with economic 
development, and PRIORITY, a FWS ranking of the priority assigned to a species’ recovery.   
B. Estimated Effects of ESA Management Actions 
We estimate the effect of ESA management action variables in an ordered probit model of 
RSCORE.  Management action variables are included as interactions with LISTED, so these 
variables are always zero for non-listed species.  Parameter estimates for various model 
specifications appear in Table VII.  In Models 16 and 17, both of the LISTEDxSPENDING and 
the LISTEDxOBJECTIVES coefficients are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that 
these management actions are effective in promoting recovery.  Both the coefficients for 
LISTEDxHABITAT and LISTEDxPLAN are negative, although only the latter is statistically 
significant.  This is an unexpected result, suggesting that management efforts to write a recovery 
plan are counterproductive.   
To explore further, we estimate MODELS 18-19 with a separate intercept for LISTED 
species, to distinguish between species that are listed but have essentially been ignored by the FWS 
                                                        
5  For instance, in the 1994 report to Congress the recovery objectives for the roseate tern (Sterna 
dougallii dougallii) included “increase nesting population to 5,000 pairs, including 6 productive colonies 
with more than 200 pairs, sustained for 5 years” (FWS, 1994a). 
   23 
in measurable management procedure and those that are not listed.  That is, spending may be zero 
for a species because it is not listed, and thus not eligible for funds, or because it is listed but has 
received no funds.   
TABLE VII: EFFECT OF MANAGEMENT ACTIONS ON RECOVERY 
          MODEL 16       MODEL 17        MODEL 18    MODEL 19  
Constant   3.40   3.34   3.46   3.44    
LISTED  -----   -----   -0.73**   -0.76** 
LISTEDxSPENDING  0.19E-04*** 0.19E-04*** 0.23E-04*** 0.23E-04** 
LISTEDxHABITAT  -0.12   -0.11   -0.30*   -0.28* 
LISTEDxPLAN -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.03   -0.02 
LISTEDxOBJECT.    0.22***  0.20**   0.19**   0.19** 
LISTEDxCONFLICT    0.02   0.03   -0.02   -0.01 
LISTEDxTIMEL -0.02***  -0.02**    -0.01    ----- 
LISTEDxPRIORITY  0.18E-02**  -----   0.03   ----- 
BODYLENGTH  0.50E-02** 0.51E-02** 0.57E-02** 0.45E-02* 
BODYLENGTH
2  -0.15E-04* -0.15E-04* -0.14E-04* -0.13E-04 
ENDANGERED -0.52*** -0.51*** -0.40**   -0.50*** 
VULNERABLE  -0.12   -0.09   -0.08   -0.09 
RARE    -0.17   -0.17   -0.26*   -0.30** 
INDETERMINATE 0.40   0.42   0.45   0.48 
UNKNOWN   -0.12   -0.09   -0.07   0.01 
MAMMAL   0.05   0.05   0.09   0.13 
AMPHIBIAN   -0.09   -0.09   -0.10   -0.15 
BIRD    -0.25   -0.26*   -0.28*   -0.32** 
REPTILE   -0.36**   -0.35**   -0.45**   -0.42** 
MONOTYPIC   -0.02   -0.02   -----   -0.30E-02*** 
Log Likelihood    -811.87   -814.23   -792.44   -789.25 
McFadden’s R
2   0.06   0.06   0.07   0.07 
￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ LQGLFDWH SDUDPHWHU VLJQLILFDQFH DW .  ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ DQG ￿￿￿￿￿ UHVSHFWLYHO\￿ 
 
  In Models 18-19, the coefficient for LISTED is negative and statistically significant.  This   24 
is consistent with the results from the previous section. As in Models 16-17, both of the LISTEDx 
SPENDING and the LISTEDxOBJECTIVES coefficients are positive and statistically significant, 
indicating that these management actions are effective in promoting recovery. However, the 
coefficients for LISTEDxHABITAT and LISTEDxPLAN are negative, but now the effect of 
habitat is statistically significant, albeit marginally so. The length of time a species has been listed 
always has a negative coefficient, but in Model 18 the effect is not significant. Similarly, the effect 
of FWS priority rankings is positive in models 16 and 18, but insignificant once listed and unlisted 
species are distinguished.    
  We tested models 16-19 for endogeneity of the listed and listed-management variables by 
estimating predicted values for these potentially endogenous variables and entering the difference 
between the variables and their predicted values as regressors in the models. The p-values for a 
Wald test of joint non-significance of these regressors range from 0.29 to 0.53, so the null of no 
joint endogeneity could not be rejected. We also tested for sample selection bias using the Heckman 
two-step procedure, and the null of no sample selection bias could not be rejected (the t-statistics 
for the inverse Mill’s ratio ranged from 0.36 to 1.09). 
  We calculated marginal effects using estimates from Model 19 and find a consistent 
change in sign at RSCORE=6, with the direction of change depending on the sign of the variable’s 
coefficient. Increases in SPENDING and achievement of recovery objectives decrease the 
probability of a lower recovery score (RSCORE ￿￿￿ DQG LQFUHDVHV WKH SUREDELOLW\ RI D KLJKHU
recovery score (RESCORE ￿￿￿￿ /LVWLQJ DQG FULWLFDO KDELWDW GHVLJQDWLRQ LQFUHDVH WKH SUREDELOLW\ RI
RSCORE ￿￿￿ DQG GHFUHDVH WKH SUREDELOLW\ RI 56&25( ￿￿￿ 
VI. SUMMARY AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Prior research contains strong evidence that the implementation of the ESA is beset by 
problems of interest group and political pressure and possible bureaucratic biases.  However, very 
little evidence exists on whether the ESA is effective in promoting species recovery.  This paper   25 
contributes to filling this vacuum.   
Our main empirical findings are as follows:  First, a species listed under the ESA has 
poorer prospects for recovery than a species not so listed.  Second, for listed species, some FWS 
management actions are effective in promoting recovery, some seem to have no effect, and some 
may be counterproductive.  Species-specific spending and the achievement of recovery objectives 
are effective instruments for species recovery. Conversely, we find that designation of critical 
habitat and recovery plan completion have, at best, no effect on recovery. The finding of a positive 
marginal effect for spending indicates higher funding for endangered species could increase species 
viability, if the funds are directed in a species-specific manner. Thus, last year’s cut of $9.1 million 
in the endangered species program budget (Associated Press 2001) could imply slower recovery.  
  Third, our results show that the existence of conflict with development and the time a 
species has been listed do not have a significant effect on recovery. The result concerning economic 
conflict is not easy to interpret. One possible explanation is that the FWS is in fact heeding the 
ESA mandate that economic considerations should not affect decisions concerning the management 
of endangered species. As for the time a species has been listed, our result may imply that once we 
control for the effect of the original listing decision, spending, and management effort, merely being 
listed longer does not increase the likelihood of recovery. That is, a species that is listed longer may 
receive more spending and management effort over time. This, and not the passage of time per se, 
may contribute to recovery.   
 The disturbing finding that listing and, perhaps, other management actions have 
deleterious effects on recovery suggests modifications of the ESA.  Which modifications will be 
appropriate depend on the correct explanation for these findings.  Although it is beyond the scope 
of this paper to explore why the ESA appears to fail in some cases, it is useful to outline prospects 
for future research.   
Our finding could be purely statistical, the result of an unrepresentative sample,   26 
multicolinearity, or inadequate data. This is always possible and a strong case can be made for 
spending additional resources on collecting biological and economic data relevant to the ESA.  
However, this explanation is unlikely in our opinion.  Our sample of NC rankings is large and 
comprehensive and has been used by others to obtain widely acknowledged results.  Further, we 
also used changes in FWS rankings to construct a similar dependent variable and were never able 
to obtain a positive estimated listing effect.  We have also subjected our models to several 
specification tests; the finding of a deleterious listing effect is robust.   
The finding may support critics who say the ESA process is slow to respond to species in 
peril and, once a species is listed, administrative actions are weak. If  “too little, too late” is the 
source of apparent ESA ineffectiveness, policy makers may consider allocating additional 
resources and speeding the listing process. This explanation could be tested by estimating models 
which allow for more negative listing effects for species in greater peril at the time of listing.  
Unfortunately, the requisite baseline data at the time of listing are absent. The vast majority of 
species were listed before 1993, the first year of NC rankings we used.   
Finally, the finding is consistent with those who argue that an ESA listing (or its prospect) 
creates perverse incentives for private landowners to harm the species. If perverse incentives yield 
ineffectiveness, the ESA might be modified to provide more positive incentives. Negative 
incentives, if salient, are more likely to affect species existing on private land, so this explanation is 
testable by allowing the effect of listing to vary as the proportion of a species’ range is more 
confined to public land.  Unfortunately, the requisite data on species’ ranges are unavailable for 
many listed and un-listed species. 
Of course, a single study cannot provide conclusive evidence on ESA effectiveness.  We 
hope that this paper piques the interest of economists, natural scientists, and statisticians to gather 
additional data to explore other models of the political, administrative, and biological basis of 
species viability.   27 
APPENDIX: ECONOMETRIC DETAILS 
 
  Given the ordered nature of the dependent variable used in our analysis, the appropriate 
econometric model is the ordered probit. Specifically, the recovery of an endangered species can be 
specified as a function of various FWS management variables and of characteristics of the species: 
yi* = ￿￿[i + 0i, where yi* is species recovery, ￿ is a vector of parameters, xi is a vector containing 
FWS management actions and species characteristics, and 0i ~ N(0,1) is the residual.  Species 
recovery, yi*, is unobservable, but we can observe the corresponding recovery score, given by the 
variable RSCORE: RSCOREi  = 1  if  0 < yi* ￿ ￿1, RSCOREi = 2 if  ￿1 < yi* ￿ ￿2, … , RSCOREi 
= 16  if  ￿15  ￿\ i* for i= 1 ... n species, where the ￿j are threshold parameters to be estimated along 
with ￿. The corresponding probabilities that each score is observed are given by 
Prob(RSCORE1i = 1) = Prob(0i ￿ ￿1-￿￿[i)-Prob(0i < -￿￿[i￿ -￿￿1 - ￿￿[i) - -￿-￿￿[i), 
 




Prob(RSCOREi = 16) = Prob(￿15 - ￿￿[i ￿ 0i) = 1- -￿￿15 - ￿￿[i), 
 
ZKHUH -￿￿￿ LV WKH FXPXODWLYH GHQVLW\ IXQFWLRQ RI WKH VWDQGDUG QRUPDO GLVWULEXWLRQ￿  
  The likelihood function for this model is given by 
L =  ∏ ∏
= =








i i x x x x β µ β µ β β µ    ·  ·  ·   
·  ·  · ∏ ∏
= =








i i x x x β µ β µ β µ .         
The parameter estimates are obtained by maximizing this likelihood function. 
Marginal Effects 
 
  The marginal effects in the ordered probit model require careful interpretation, as they are 
not equal to the coefficients, nor do their signs necessarily correspond to the coefficients’ signs.  
Specifically, the marginal effect for a continuous variable is given by    28 
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where  ) (⋅ φ is the standard normal probability density function (Greene 2000).  
  To calculate the marginal effect for a discrete variable xj, define xjs and xjf as the starting 
and final values of xj, respectively. Additionally, define  j x−  as the vector of all regressors, except 
xj, evaluated at their sample mean. Then 
Pr(RSCORE = i|xjs) = N[(￿i- j β ˆ xjs –  ' ˆ
j − β   j x− )] – N[(￿i-1-  j β ˆ xjs –  ' ˆ
j − β j x− )] 
 
Pr(RSCORE= i|xjf) = N[(￿i- j β ˆ xjf –  ' ˆ
j − β j x− )] – N[(￿i-1- j β ˆ xjf –  ' ˆ
j − β j x− )]    
 
The marginal effect of xj LV ßPr(RSCORE = i) = Pr(RSCORE = i|xjf) - Pr(RSCORE= i|xjs) for i = 
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